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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPRFhlG COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In The Matter of VAUGHN WOOLDRIDGE, 05-R-5084,
Petitioner,
-againstANDREA D. EVANS, CHAIRPERSON, CEO,
NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE,
Respondent,
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI # 01-10-ST1500 IndexNo. 2254-10
Appearances :

Vaughn Wooldridge
Inmate No. 05-R-5084
Petitioner, Pro Se
W a11ki 11 Correctional F aci1ity
P.O. Box G
Prison Road
Wallkill, NY 12589-0286
Andrew M. Cuomo
Attorney General
State of New York
Attorney For Respondent
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
(Adam W. Silverman
Assistant Attorney General
0 4 COLIIihCl)
DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT

George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice
The petitioner. an inmate at Wallkill rorrectiona! Fwility, has cnrnmenced the instant
CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated March 24,2009
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to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. He is serving consecutive terms of
imprisonment of one and one half to three years and three to six to six years upon convictions
of attempted criminal possession of a forged instrument second degree and criminal
possession of a forged instrument in the second degree. Roth involve stolen credit cards.
The petitioner asserts that he has expressed remorse for his crime. He alleges that at
the time he was arrested he did not understand the seriousness of his crime. He indicates that
since then his mother has been a victim of identity theft; and that he now understands the
serious economic and emotional harm that came from his actions. Prior to his incarceration,
the petitioner worked as a construction worker for a number of years. He has submitted
letters of support from a construction company and a moving company reciting that he will
be employed upon his release. The petitioner also indicates that he is interested in pursuing
work as a professional counselor. He holds a General Equivalency Diploma (GED) and is
married with four children.
The petitioner alleges that while incarcerated he successfully overcame his addiction
to heroin and completed alcohol and substance abuse treatment. He indicates he received
one merit time certificate and two certificates of earned eligibility. During his incarceration
he has worked as a clerk typist in the recreation department, and completed phases I, 11, and
I11 of the Transitional Services Program. He also served as a facilitator in all three phases
of the Transitional Services Program.
Among the many arguments set forth in the petition, the petitioner contends that the
Parole Board failed to give consideration to his certificate of earned eligibility

(see

Corrections Law 6 805). He alleges a violation of the double jeopardv clause of the United
2
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States Constitution and New York Constitution; and contends that under both Constitutions
he has been deprived of due process of law. The petitioner indicates that he hrta becn
incarcerated for twenty three months longer than the minimum guideline range

(see 9

NYCRR 8001.3) . He asserts that the Parole Board impermissibly ignored the statutory
factors set forth in Executive Law $ 259-i (2) (c) (A) to determine whether he would live and
remain at liberty without violating the law. He claims that the Board’s determination is
nonfactual and conclusory, in violation of Executive Law tj 259-i (1) (a); and that the twenty
four month “hold” is excessive.
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole
are set forth as follows:
“Despite issuance of an Earned Eligibility Certificate,
discretionary release is denied. Following a carefid review of
your record and interview, this panel concludes that, if released,
there is a reasonable probability that you would not live and
remain at liberty without violating the law. Your release is thus
not presently compatible with the public safety and welfare.
Your instant offenses in Brooklyn in February of 2005 involved
your use of a forged Home Depot Credit Card to access
merchandise. Your criminal history includes prior murder,
stolen property, and robbery related offenses. Your institutional
programming indicates progress and achievement, which is to
your credit. Your disciplinary record appears clean and is
likewise noted. You have approximately seven felonies. This
is your second New York bid. You also served state time in
North Carolina for a murder related conviction.”
As stated in Executive Law $2594 (2) (c) (A):

“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable
probability that, if such inmate is released. he will live and
remain at liberty without violatin: the IRW, ~ n ahat
d his release
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so
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deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational
education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii)
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release
program; (iii) release plans including community resources,
employment, education and training and support services
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s
representative [I” (Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A]).
Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory
requirements, not reviewable (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789 [3d Dept.,
20041; Matter of Collado v New York State Division of Parole, 287 AD2d 92 1 [3d Dept.,
200 13). If the Parole Board’s decision is made in accordance with the statutory requirements,
the Board’s determination is not subject to judicial review (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis,
suma). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety” on the part

of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon
v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting hlaiicr u i I C u w

L.

NUN I‘uA Stair: U d

uf’

Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which
to disturb the discretionary determination made by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v.
New York State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021).
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense. attention was paid ta such
4
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factors as petitioner’s institutional programming, his disciplinary record, and his plans upon
release. The decision was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the
denial of parole and it satisfied the requirements of Executive Law $2594 (see Matter of
Siao-Pao, 11 NY3d 773 [2008]; Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept.,
19941; Matter of Green v. New York State Division of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept.,
19931). It is proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of
the inmate’s crimes and their violent nature (see Matter of Weir v. New York State Division
ofparole, 205 AD2d906,907 [3rdDept., 19941; Matterof \inomjli

1

hci\ Y’L)[-I\ Slate lhwd

of Parole, 189 AD2d 960, supra; Matter of Dudlev v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept.,
1996), as well as the inmate’s criminal history (see Matter of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d 629
[3rd Dept., 19971; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept., 19981). The
Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it
considered in determining the inmate’s application, or to expressly discuss each one (see
Matter of Young v New York Division of Parole, 74 AD 3d 1681 [3rdDept., 20101; Matter

of Wise v New York State Division of Parole, 54 AD3d 463 [3rdDept., 20081). Nor must the
parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the first sentence of Executive
Law 5 259-i (2) (c) (A) (E Matter of Silver0 v Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3rdDept., 20061).
In other words, “[wlhere appropriate the Board may give considerable weight to, or place
particular emphasis w, the cii-2uiitsiaiicesof the crimes for which a petitioner is incarwuted,
as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the other statutory factors, in
determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty without violating the law,’
whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare of society,’ and whether

5
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release will 'deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to undermine respect for [the] law"'
(Matter of Durio v New York State Division of Parole, 3 AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041,
quoting Executive Law $259-i [2] [c] [A], other citations omitted).
It is well settled that receipt of a certificate of earned eligibility does not serve as a
guarantee of release (Matter of Dorman v New York State Board of Parole, 30 AD3d 880 [3rd
Dept., 20061; Matter of Pearl v New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1058 [3rd
Dept., 20061).
Petitioner's claims that the determination to deny parole is tantamount to a resentencing, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clauses's prohibition against multiple
punishments are conclusory and without merit (see J l ~ t i c ru i B~d.c11oI hcit l ' o A SiaLc
Parole Board, 227 AD2d 75 1 [3rdDept., 19961; Matter of Crews v New York State Executive
1)crwrtrncxi I h ~ i t - d(11' A,2ppcalsC i m , 281 AD2d 672 [3rdDept., 20011; Matter of Evans v

Dennison, 13 Misc3d 1236A, [Sup. Ct., Westchester Co., 20061). The fact that an inmate has
served his or her minimum sentence does not confer upon the inmate a protected liberty
interest in parole release (see Matter of Motti v Alexander, 54 AD3d 1 1 14, 1115 [3rdDept.,
20081). The Parole Board is vested with the discretion to determine whether release was
appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing court set the minimum term of
petitioner's sentence (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000]; Matter of
Cody v Dennison, 33 AL12d 1141, 1142 [3rdDept., 20061 lv denied 8 NY3d 802 [2007];
Matter of Burress v Dennison, 37 AD3d 930 [3rdDept., 20071).
With regard to petitioner's arguments concerning an alleged violation of his right to
due procesq, the Court first observes that there is no inherent right to parole under the
6
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constitution of either the United States or the State of New York (see Greenholtz v Inmates
nf the N e h s k a Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 US 1, 7 [ 19791; >Jstter of R u m

Y

New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 73, supra). It has been repeatedly held that
Executive Law

6 2594 does not create in any prisoner an entitlement to, or a legitimate

expectation of, release; therefore, no constitutionallyprotected liberty interests are implicated
by the Parole Board's exercise of its discretion to deny parole (see Barna v Travis, 239 F3d
169, 171 [2d Cir., 20011; Marvin v Goord, 255 F3d 40, 44 [2d Cir., 20011; Boothe v
Hammock, 605 F2d 66 1,664 [2d Cir., 19791; Paunetto v Hammock, 5 16 F Supp 1367,13671368 [SDNY, 19811; U ~ I [ IO L
I ' I <~L I >IL ( >

\

hcl\k

'1'cl1h S l ; t l ~ ~ U d01
. J'ilTGJC, 50NY2d69,75-76,

supra, Matter of Gamez v Dennison, 18 AD3d 1099 [3rd Dept., 20051; Matter of Lozada v
New York State Div. of Parole, 36 AD3d 1046, 1046 [3rd Dept., 20071). The Court,
accordingly, finds no due process violation.
Addressing petitioner's argument with respect to the guideline range, even if he had
served time in excess of the guideline range, the guidelines "are intended only as a guide, and
are not a substitute for the carehl consideration of the many circumstances of each
individual case" (9 NYCRR 8001.3 [a]; Matter of Tatta v State of New York Division of
Parole, 290 AD2d 907,908 [3rd Dept., 20021). Thus, the Court finds that this does not serve
as a basis to overturn the Board's decision.
In addition, the Parole Board's decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24
months) is within the Board's discretion and was supported by the record (seeMatter of Tatta
v State of New York Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, lv denied 98
NY2d 604).
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The Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and contentions and finds
them to be without merit.
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The
pdition must therefore be dismissed.
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the
petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order,
is sealing all records submitted for in camera review.
Accordingly, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed.
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original
decision/order/judgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing.

The signing of this

decision/order/judgment and delivery of this decision/order/judgment does not constitute
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable
provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry.

d

ENTER
,

A

'

u

'

Dated: August /7 ,2010
Troy, New York
George B. Ceresia, Jr.
Papers Considered:
1.
2.
3.

Order To Show Cause dated May 12. 2010, Petition, Supporting Papers and
Exhibits
Respondent's Answer dated July 7,2010, Supporting Papers and Exhibits
Petitioner's Reply dated Jiily 14, P 1 0
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